We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents' effort/performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. We find that agents sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if the agents' payoff is independent of the principals' feedback. Based on our experimental analysis we propose a principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that accommodates this finding. We analyze the agents' (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare in this environment. JEL:D01; D02; D82; D86; J41.
(1999)] and the potential for conflict due to subjective and, hence, possibly diverging performance assessments by principals and agents [see McLeod(2003) ]. Furthermore, associated with the potential for conflict, a central insight in this literature is that employment relations based on subjective performance evaluations are particularly fragile in one-shot interactions. If labor contracts specify payments on the basis of the principals' subjective appraisals, principals have an incentive to claim that performance was poor in order to establish low wages. As a consequence, inefficiently low effort may be spend by agents -unless principals can credibly commit to an honest revelation of their subjective information as, for instance, in repeated interaction or with a credible payment to a third party [see e.g. Levine (2003) or McLeod (2003) ].
In contrast to this, we demonstrate in our analysis that the credibility of a truthful revelation of the principals' subjective performance signal can also be established in oneshot interactions and without a third party as agents tend to create 'costly conflicts' for principals if their own subjective performance appraisals are better than the principals' feedback. That is, we first experimentally show that agents are willing to forgo own payoff to create 'costly conflicts', if their own subjective performance appraisals are better than the principals' and second, formalize and analyze a simple principal-agent model that incorporates our experimental findings.
Specifically, our laboratory experiment matches participants into pairs and randomly assigns them to one of two roles, principal or agent. The agent has to work on a real effort task. The task is such that both agent and principal only get a subjective signal about the agent's performance. The principal benefits from the effort of the agent and gives performance feedback. In reaction to the feedback, the agent has the opportunity to reduce the principal's payoff at a cost for himself. In our experiment we find that agents' reactions to principals' feedback strongly depend on their self-perceptions. Agents reduce payoffs of principals, if the principals' feedback is below their self-perception, but accept the feedback and refuse to reduce payoffs if the feedback confirms/is higher than their own evaluation.
This pattern can be observed in an incentive treatment where the principal's feedback determines the agent's payoff and in a flat treatment where the agent's payoff is constant and thereby unaffected by the feedback. The willingness to reduce payoffs in the incentive treatment can be explained by distributional concerns as e.g. inequity aversion or reciprocity. As payoffs are according to the principal's feedback, the agent may consider a feedback below his own evaluation as a decision that generates an unequal payoff distribution, or as an unkind act by the principal whose willingness to pay falls short of the agent's expectations or what the agent feels entitled to. However, the results of incentive and flat treatment taken together rather suggest a motivation for payoff reductions that is not driven by the payoff consequences of the principal's feedback but by the tension between subjective feedback and the agent's self-evaluation as such. The fact that individuals dislike a tension between feedback and self-perception, and regard it as a threat to their self-esteem, i.e. an ego-threat, that triggers aggressive behavior or conflict as a protection mechanism is a central finding in social psychology. As shown e.g. by Greenwald (1980) , Bushman & Baumeister (1998) and Baumeister (2005) ], people seem to care about their self-esteem and try to enhance, maintain and protect it.
Based on our experimental findings and the corresponding insights from social psychology, we present a simple principal-agent model that captures the agent's eagerness to protect his self-esteem against ego-threats. Within this model we analyze the dependence of the agent's (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare on the agent's sensitivity towards ego-threats, the nature of conflict created by the agent, and the quality of subjective performance evaluations. We demonstrate that an increase in the level of conflict that the agent can impose on the principal or the sensitivity of the agent towards ego-threats enhances welfare if the effort of the agent is sufficiently valuable (i.e., if the agent works on a valuable project) even if conflict and the dis-utility from ego-threats are costly from a welfare point of view. The reason is that an enhanced level of conflict or sensitivity increases the maximum effort that can be implemented by the principal which is a binding constraint for valuable projects. Hence, in particular for these projects, high levels of potential conflict and a high sensitivity of employees towards ego-threats should be appreciated by employers as they facilitate a credible commitment towards a truthful revelation of the principals' performance signals and thereby help establishing incentives to induce high effort levels. Therefore, employers facing the problem of subjective performance evaluations in their relation to employees should not per-se try to select a work-force with a low sensitivity towards ego-threats or without independent judgment, or try to eliminate opportunities of conflict creation.
In recent years also economists have started to acknowledge the importance of selfesteem in decision making and strategic interactions [e.g. Elling-sen & Johannesson (2008), Compte & Postlewaite (2004) , Bénabou & Tirole (2002) , Köszegi (2006) ]. It is argued that people strive for positive self-perceptions because they entail a consumption and motivational value. For example, Köszegi (2006) endows individuals with ego-utility and demonstrates its effect on choices between more or less ambitious tasks. In particular, this model explains the phenomenon of overconfidence by individuals who update believes according to Bayes' rule. Bénabou & Tirole (2002) , Compte & Postlewaite (2004) , and Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008) on the other hand, center on the motivational value of self-confidence. It is argued that confidence in one's ability and efficacy or a psychological payoff from being esteemed by others can help individuals to undertake more ambitious tasks. When people have imperfect knowledge about their own ability and/or when effort and ability are complements, then more self-confidence enhances peoples' motivation to act [Bénabou & Tirole (2002) : 873].
As said before, however, psychologists have not only identified the implicit impact of self-esteem on information processing and motivation, but also stress people's eagerness to actively maintain and protect positive self-perceptions. First, people protect their self-esteem by systematically taking credit for success and denying blame for failure and second, people have a tendency to uncritically accept positive feedback and eagerly search for flaws/faults in other's criticism [e.g. Baumeister (2005) , Greenwald (1980) ]. Third and most importantly for our investigation, psychologists have found that conflicts and aggression tend to result from positive self-images that are challenged or threatened [e.g. Baird (1977) , Raskin et al (1991) , Bushman & Baumeister (1998) ]. It is argued that hostile aggression is an expression of the self's rejection of ego-threatening evaluations received from other people [e.g. Baumeister et al (1996) ]. People with high self-esteem usually hold confident and highly favorable ideas about themselves, i.e. they exhibit ego-involvement, and react belligerently to ego-threatening feedback from others [Baird (1977) , Shrauger & Lund (1975) and Korman (1969) ]. Our contribution demonstrates the significance of these effects in an incentivized laboratory experiment and proposes a simple model that formalizes these findings.
In the following section we present the set-up of our experiment. In section II, we discuss our experimental findings regarding conflict creation. In section III, we present a principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that includes preferences for conflict creation in-line with our experimental findings. Section IV concludes with some remarks on the practical implications of our analysis.
I. Experimental Set-up
In this experiment we investigate individual reactions to performance feedback in environments in which people only have subjective performance information. The experiment 3 took place in June and November 2009 in the laboratory of the Center for Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen with in total 186 participants who completed the experiment. 1 We conducted two treatments, incentive and flat, each consisting of four experimental sessions. On average participants took 45 minutes to complete the experiment and received about 110 DKK (∼ 15 Euros). At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were randomly assigned to a group and one of two different roles labeled Person A and Person B. Each group consisted of one Person A and one Person B. Participants were provided with experimental instructions (see Appendix C). After reading the instructions, participants took actions at four different stages: i) control questions, ii) clicking-task, iii) evaluation and feedback and iv) reaction.
In stage i) (control questions), all participants had to answer a set of control questions before being able to proceed (for the corresponding screen-shots see Appendix D).
In stage ii) (clicking-task), participants in the role of Person B had to work on a realeffort task (i.e. they acted as 'agents'). The real-effort task consisted of clicking away boxes on a computer screen (for a screen-shot of the clicking task see Appendix D). For a period of x seconds, 20 screens with boxes appeared for various time intervals (i.e. between 3 and 9 seconds). At the end of each time interval the screen disappeared with the remaining (i.e. un-clicked) boxes and a new screen with a new set of boxes popped up. In order to create heterogeneity in B-Persons' self evaluations, we had one session in which x = 120, two sessions in which x = 90 and one session in which x = 50 in each treatment. 2 Person A saw the same screen as Person B and could observe him clicking away the boxes (i.e., Person A acted as a 'principal').
In both treatments, Person A's payoff was determined by the percentage of boxes clicked away by Person B during the clicking-task. 3 If At stage iii) (evaluation and feedback), both participants were asked to evaluate B's performance by telling the percentage of boxes that B clicked away (i.e., both participants had to state one of the five categories 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, 80-100%). Furthermore, Person A was asked to give feedback to Person B with the same categories. In the incentive treatment, Person B's payoff depended on Person A's feedback as follows:
• Person A's feedback 0-20%: Person B received 100 points from A. 1 In total 190 persons participated but 4 participants (2 groups) did not complete the experiment due to a technical problem. The analysis is based on the 186 individuals that completed the experiment.
2 Note that the 20 screens were the same in all sessions. We only varied the number of seconds that the screen was shown. 3 In the instructions (see Appendix C), we informed participants about the payoff scheme. Payoffs in the experiment were expressed in points and participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment that points were exchanged into Danish crowns at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10 points = 3.5 DKK. For a summary statistic concerning the number of participants per treatment/session, number of appeared boxes/average number of boxes clicked away etc see Appendix E.
In the flat treatment, on the other hand, Person B's payoff was 200 points independent of Person A's feedback.
At stage iv) (reaction), Person B was able to react to Person A's feedback with a reduction of Person A's payoff by up to 100 points. To elicit reaction behavior, we used the strategy method: while Person A was giving feedback, we asked Person B to indicate for each possible feedback that he could receive by how much he would like to reduce Person A's payoff. Hence, for each possible feedback level (0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, 80-100%) Person B had to state between 0 and 100 points by which he wanted to reduce Person A's payoff in case this was Person A's actually stated feedback. For every point that Person B reduced Person A's payoff, Person B had to pay 0.25 points.
After stage iv) and a small questionnaire, Person B's real performance, Person A's feedback and Person B's reaction to Person A's actual feedback was used to calculate payoffs. Finally, participants were shown the actual performance of Person B, Person A's feedback, Person B's reaction and the actual payoffs on their screen. Note that at the evaluation and feedback as well as the reaction stage, Person A and B decided on the basis of their subjective perception of Person B's performance. Only in the end of the experiment when payoffs were listed, participants learned about B's actual performance.
II. Conflict Creation

A. Experimental Observations
Using the strategy method, we elicited the self-perception ('own evaluation') of each B-Person and the number of points that he wanted to reduce Person A's payoff ('payoff reduction'), if Person A's feedback was 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80% and 80-100%. Table 1 and 2 display the median payoff reduction in the incentive and the flat treatment, respectively.
[ Tables 1 and 2 
here]
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that in both treatments the median payoff reduction at feedback levels below own evaluation is positive. Furthermore, for the incentive treatment, the median payoff reduction increases in the gap between feedback and own evaluation of B-Persons. In contrast to this, at feedback levels equal and above own evaluations the median payoff reduction is 0 in both treatments (with two exceptions: the payoff reduction of people with own evaluation 40-60 and 60-80 at feedback levels 40-60 and 60-80, respectively, in the incentive treatment). Hence, the median B-Persons in our experiment reduce Person A's payoff if they receive a feedback from Person A that falls short of their own evaluation but typically refuse to reduce Person A's payoff after feedback that confirms / is above their own evaluation -regardless of whether the payoff that Person B receives is dependent or independent of the feedback that Person A gives.
B. Testable Hypotheses
As a payoff reduction is costly for Person B and the interaction between Person A and B is one-shot, assuming selfishness and rationality would certainly yield the prediction of no payoff reduction in both treatments. We will refer to this case as Hypothesis 0. For the incentive treatment, Person A's feedback determines the payoff for Person B (and may contain information about Person B's performance) while Person B's own evaluation is a subjective signal about his performance (and thereby also Person A's actual payoff). For the following derivation of the hypotheses, we assume that Person B considers his own signal at least as informative as Person A's feedback. For a given feedback level, the payoff distribution is therefore expected to be equal in the incentive treatment if Person B's own evaluation is equal to the feedback and expected to be unequal in favor of Person A if the feedback is below Person B's own evaluation. If payoff reductions are motivated by inequity aversion or (negative) reciprocity, we thus expect (weakly) larger payoff reductions if the feedback is below Person B's own evaluation than if feedback and own evaluation coincide. As a feedback above Person B's own evaluation yields an expected payoff distribution in favor of Person B, inequity aversion would not predict any payoff reduction in this case (recall that one unit of reduced payoff for Person A only costs 1/4 unit for Person B). Similarly, reciprocity would not predict larger payoff reductions than for a coincidence of feedback and own evaluations. 4 We summarize as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the incentive treatment, for a given feedback, payoff reductions are smaller if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B's own evaluation.
In the flat treatment, Person B's payoff is independent of Person A's feedback. Hence, Person A's feedback can neither be regarded as a kind nor an unkind act regarding monetary outcomes. Therefore, reciprocity would not predict any payoff reductions.
HYPOTHESIS 2: In the flat treatment, no payoff reduction is observed.
In contrast, if Person B is inequity averse, he may well have an incentive to reduce payoffs. For a given own evaluation of Person B, however, these incentives are either independent of Person A's feedback (if the feedback is considered as uninformative regarding the actual payoff distribution) or increasing in Person A's feedback (if the feedback is considered as informative regarding the actual payoff distribution and higher feedback levels imply higher expected payoff for Person A).
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the flat treatment, for a given evaluation of Person B, payoff reductions are (weakly) larger if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B's own evaluation.
In contrast to the above-mentioned payoff related motives and as discussed in the introduction, the psychological literature rather emphasizes the tension between Person B's own evaluations and Person A's feedback as such. If Person B regards a feedback below his own evaluation as a harmful ego-threat, while no ego-threat is perceived if feedback and self-evaluation coincide or the former exceeds the latter, and if Person B prefers to initiate costly conflict as ego-protection, then psychological costs (and the motivation to reduce payoffs) are larger if the feedback is below Person B's own evaluation rather than equal of above in both treatments. This resembles Hypothesis 1 for the incentive treatment but yields new hypothesis for the flat treatment. 5 HYPOTHESIS 4: In the flat treatment, for a given evaluation of Person B, payoff reductions are smaller if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B's own evaluation.
To summarize, (costly) payoff reductions cannot be explained on the basis of rational, selfish behavior. However, several assumptions on complex preferences offer an explanation for payoff reductions. While all of these assumptions coincide regarding the hypothesis for the incentive treatment, different predictions are formed for the flat treatment. In particular, models of inequity aversion and reciprocity predict either no or a positive impact of feedback on payoff reductions in the flat treatment, while the protection against ego-threats suggests a negative relation (i.e., lower feedback -for a given self-evaluation -increases payoff reduction). In the next section, we will test the corresponding hypotheses.
C. Data Analysis
For the tests, we consider each feedback level separately and ask whether the behavior of B-Persons for whom this feedback level lies Below their own-evaluation significantly differs from B-Persons for whom this feedback level is Equal/Above their own evaluation.
[ Tables 3 and 4 Table 3 ) shows that for feedback levels below 80-100 the median payoff reduction of B-Persons for whom the feedback level is below (i.e. Below ) their own evaluation is higher than the median payoff reduction of B-Persons for whom the feedback level is confirming or above (i.e. Equal/Above) their own evaluation. Note that, as in the incentive treatment there is no 
here]
In Tables 3 and 4 we report for each feedback level the median payoff reduction of B-Persons for whom this feedback level is Equal/Above their own evaluation and for whom this feedback level is Below their own evaluation. The corresponding number of observations is given in brackets. Furthermore we report the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test which analyzes whether the difference between Equal/Above and Below is significant.
B-Person with an own evaluation 0-20 we cannot report a median payoff reduction for the group Equal/Above at feedback level 0-20. Furthermore, as by design there are no own evaluations above 80-100 we also cannot report a median payoff reduction for the group Below at feedback level 80-100. As shown in Table 3 , the differences in payoff reductions are significant up to the feedback level 60-80 for which the difference of the medians is still positive (10 points) but the result of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows an insignificant difference between Equal/Above and Below.
RESULT 1: In the incentive treatment, for a given feedback level, (i) the median Person B reduces payoffs of Person A if feedback is below their own evaluation, but (ii) does not reduce payoffs if feedback is confirming or above own evaluation. This rejects Hypotheses 0 and confirms Hypotheses 1.
Hence, payoff reductions at stage iv) in the incentive treatment are in-line with the assumption of distributional concerns, reciprocity, and the protection against ego-threats.
To quite some extent, the results in the flat treatment (see Table 4 ) resemble the results from the incentive treatment. Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test in the flat treatment shows a significant difference between these two groups at all feedback levels up to 60-80. Hence, even if the payoff of Person B is independent of Person A's feedback, payoff reduction is significantly higher in situations in which the feedback falls short of the own evaluation compared to feedback that is confirming or above Person B's self perception. Summarizing, RESULT 2: In the flat treatment, for a given feedback level, (i) the median Person B reduces payoffs of Person A if feedback is below their own evaluation, but (ii) does not reduce payoffs if feedback is confirming or above own evaluation. This rejects Hypotheses 0 and 2.
Hence, behavior regarding payoff reductions at stage iv) in the flat treatment can hardly be explained by reciprocity. To analyze the explanatory power of distributional concerns and the protection against ego-threats with a test of Hypotheses 3 and 4, we investigate the feedback dependence of payoff reductions for a given self-evaluation by Person B.
[ Table 5 here] Table 5 depicts the actual median payoff reduction by B-Persons with feedback equal/above and below own evaluation for the feedback given by Person A during the experiment. As indicated in the second line (flat treatment), median payoff reduction is zero if the feedback is above/equal to Person B's own evaluation and 30.5 if the feedback is below Person B's own evaluation. As indicated by the corresponding Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, median payoff reduction are indeed significantly different for the two cases.
RESULT 3: In the flat treatment, for a given self-evaluation, the median Person B reduces the payoff of Person A more if the feedback is below rather than above/equal the self-evaluation. This rejects Hypothesis 3 and confirms Hypothesis 4.
To summarize, taking together the results from the incentive and flat treatment, our data not only rejects the hypothesis that participants act as selfish maximizers of individual profit, but also demonstrates that models of distributional concerns and reciprocity only explain our findings to a limited extent. In contrast to this, assuming that Person B faces psychological costs of ego-threats (and psychological benefits from a protection of self-esteem) yields predictions regarding payoff reductions that are in line with the results of our experiment.
III. A principal agent model with subjective evaluation
In this section, we propose and analyze a simple principal agent model with subjective performance evaluation to illustrate the economic implications of conflicts generated as a protection against ego-threats. For the sake of comparability to the literature, we now switch from our neutral experimental setting (with Person A and B) to the usual terminology of principal and agent.
The model Assume there is a risk-neutral principal, P , who decides upon undertaking a project which generates a value of φ > 0 if successful. The project requires effort of an agent, A. Assume that if the agent spends effort p ∈ [0, 1], the project will be successful (create value φ) with probability p. The project is a complex good or service and its success is not verifiable, i.e. contracts contingent on the generation of φ are not feasible. Neither principal nor agent can directly observe whether the project is successful or not. Rather, both form an opinion about the agent's performance during the production process. I.e., they receive private signals about the agent's performance. The principal receives s P ∈ S P , where S P = {L, H}, i.e. the principal's opinion can be such that he regards the agent's performance as either high (H) or low (L). Analogously, the agent receives s A ∈ S A with S A = {L, H}. The signals s P and s A are non-verifiable private pieces of information of the principal and the agent, respectively. The signals are informative with respect to the success of the project. If the project is not successful (which happens with probability (1−p)), principal and agent receive the signal s P = s A = L. If the project is successful, the principal receives the signal s P = H with probability g, the agent receives the same signal as the principal with probability ρ and receives s A = H as an independent signal with probability x. Hence, g measures the quality of the principal's signal, ρ indicates the correlation between the agent's and the principal's signal -or the counter-probability of an independent judgment -and x quantifies the quality of the agent's signal if he forms an independent judgment [our specification of the information technology coincides with Mcleod (2003), p.228, for expositional ease we restrict ourselves to the case of a binary signal].
ASSUMPTION 1: (Information Technology) We assume that the principal's and the agent's signal are imperfect, i.e., g ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0, 1), and positively but imperfectly correlated, i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1).
We denote by γ kl the conditional probability that s P = k and s A = l given that the project is a success. Then, the ex-ante probability for the signal pair s P = L and s A = H, for instance, will be pγ LH = p(1 − g)(1 − ρ)x. 6 Note that by Assumption 1,
The timing of the game is as follows:
1) The principal offers a contract to the agent and the agent decides upon acceptance. Upfront payments are arranged.
2) The agent decides upon effort p.
3) The project generates value φ with probability p.
4) The principal receives s P and the agent receives s A . The principal and the agent report (not necessarily truth-fully) on s P and s A . Denote the reports by t P and t A , respectively. t P and t A are verifiable.
5) The payments contingent on t P and t A are arranged. 6) Contingent on s A and received payments, the agent decides upon retaliation (with effort q).
For an effort of p the agent incurs costs v(p) with v ∈ C 2 , v(0) = 0, v (0) = 0, v (p) > 0 and lim p→1 v (p) = ∞. Had the principal access to the agent's production technology, his effort choice would solve v (p) = φ. For further reference, we will denote the first best effort level by p F B and the respective surplus by Π F B . Our assumptions on v(p) ensure that p F B ∈ (0, 1).
The agent is risk-neutral and senses a psychological payoff that depends on his opinion about his own performance, s A , and the reported opinion of the principal, t P . More specifically, the agent's utility function reads:
Thereby, w denotes the wage payment, Y (t P , s A ) represents the agent's psychological payoff for a given configuration of (reported) signals, q is the level of conflict (or retaliation) created by the agent and c(q) is the agent's cost for the level of conflict q with c ∈ C 2 , c(0) = 0, c (0) = 0, c (q) > 0 and lim q→1 c (q) = ∞.
On the background of our experimental findings and the evidence from social psychology on self-esteem, ego-threats, and conflict creation, we specify Y (t P , s A ) as follows. According to Lemma 1, the agent creates conflict or retaliates (i.e., chooses q > 0) if and only if s A = H and t P = L, i.e., the agent retaliates if and only if he has a high opinion of himself and his ego / self-perception is threatened. This corresponds to our experimental finding that payoffs are only reduced if feedback is below the agent's selfevaluation. For further reference we abbreviate Y (L, H) ≡ Y . Moreover, q * > 0 will henceforth denote the conflict level for the configuration t P = L and s A = H. As the agent chooses q = 0 for all other configurations, no confusion should arise. Note that the higher the psychological costs created by the difference in the principal's and agent's evaluation (Y ), the higher the level of conflict q * . We assume throughout this Section that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
The principal is risk neutral and maximizes expected profit
where pφ is the expected benefit generated by the agent, E {w} are the expected wage cost of employing the agent, and E {q} ψ are the expected costs of conflict due to retaliation. As our assumptions on c(q) ensure that q ∈ [0, 1], we can interpret q as the probability with which the agent creates costs of ψ > 0 for the principal. First best profits are given by
A standard application of the revelation principle (for details see Lemma 3 in Appendix B) implies that we can restrict ourselves -without loss of generality -to simple bonus contracts (a fixed or up-front payment f independent on reported signals and a bonus payment b if the principal reports t P = H). In particular, we can restrict ourselves to bonus payments that are independent of the agent's (opportunistic) report.
Moral Hazard The principal's objective to offer a profit maximizing contract -i.e., an optimal combination of a fixed payment and a bonus -is burdened with (i) moral hazard as the agent's effort is unobservable and (ii) a truth-telling problem as the principal has to credibly commit herself to a truthful revelation of her own signal. As long as the truth-telling constraint is non-binding (pure moral hazard case), the analysis is a straightforward application of standard incentive theory. The corresponding analysis is relegated to Appendix B. For further reference, we report the comparative statics of 12 optimal effort levels and profits for the pure moral hazard case. 7
PROPOSITION 1: (Pure Moral Hazard)
There exists φ > 0 such that for φ > φ, (i) dp dφ > 0, dp dψ < 0, dp dg > 0, dp dρ > 0, and dp dx < 0 and (ii) dΠ dφ > 0, dΠ dψ < 0, dΠ dg > 0, dΠ dρ > 0, and dΠ dx < 0. Hence, if the project is sufficiently valuable to implement a positive effort level (i.e., p > 0 because φ is large compared to costs of effort implementation including the agent's effort costs, expected retaliation for the principal, and the expected compensation for the psychological costs of the agent), an increase in the value of the project certainly enhances marginal benefits and therebyp. Likewise, higher costs of conflict for the principal enhance marginal costs and lower the optimal effort level (recall that signals are conflicting only if the project is successful). A higher quality of the principal's signal reduces the probability of conflict which reduces marginal costs and leads to higher optimal effort levels. A higher correlation of signals or a lower quality of an independent judgment have a similar effect as they also result in lower expected conflict levels and a lower compensation of psychological costs. As indicated in Part (ii), these intuitive effects also carry over to the comparative statics of the principal's profit. The higher the value of the project and the lower expected costs associated with the retaliation of the agent, the more profit is awarded to the principal. In particular, the principal gains from a decrease in retaliation costs ψ (i.e. the size of conflict), an increase in the principal's signal quality g, an increase in the signal correlation ρ and a decrease in the probability that the agent receives an independent signal x (as all these properties of the information technology reduce the probability of conflict).
As the agent does not receive any rents in the optimal contract, the principal's profit also measures the surplus of the relationship. Hence, in the case of non-binding truthtelling constraints, conflicts (i.e. their likelihood γ LH and size q * Ψ -and thereby the agent's psychological sensitivity Y ) only have a welfare detrimental effect. Therefore, any property of the information technology which reduces conflict (i.e. an increase in g or ρ) is welfare-enhancing, while an increase in the quality of the agent's independent judgment x induces the adverse effect.
Truth-telling The truth-telling problem can be represented by the following table (with the principal's report depicted in the rows, the agent's report depicted in the columns, and the principal's profit as entries). 8
Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoff from doing so (which reads pφ − f − b) is larger than his payoff from reporting t P = L (which reads pφ − f − P r(s A = H | s P = H)q * ψ). This means the principal reports t P = H if
The principal can only credibly promise a bonus b below b max . Note that this upper bound to credible bonuses increases in the signal correlation ρ and in the quality of an independent judgment x. An increase in each of these parameters lowers the probability of the configuration s P = H and s A = L in which case the principal could cheat without facing retaliation and therefore reduces the incentive to save the bonus payment. Moreover, b max certainly increases in the level of conflict q * ψ. However, the maximal credible bonus is independent of g as the principal is only tempted to lie if he received a positive signal. If s P = L, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoff from doing so (which reads pφ − f − P r(s A = H | s P = L)q * ψ) is larger than his payoff from reporting t P = H (which reads pφ − f − b). Hence, the principal reports t P = L if
The principal can also not promise to pay arbitrarily low bonuses as he has an incentive to evade conflict through 'unconditional bonuses'. By paying the bonus independently of his signal, the principal avoids any conflict with an agent who is prepared to protect his positive self-image. The minimal credible bonus is thereby decreasing in the signal correlation ρ and increasing in the quality of an independent judgment x because the larger ρ and the smaller x the smaller is the probability of the configuration s A = H and s P = L in which case the principal would benefit from conflict evasion. Similarly to b max , b min is independent of g. Note in particular that b max > b min > 0 and that the difference between b max and b min gets larger and the respective interval is shifted towards larger bonuses as q * or ψ increases. Hence, the larger the potential conflict level, the higher are the bonuses that can be implemented. In fact, for every bonus b there is a conflict level ψ such that b is credible. 9 Hence, while elevated levels of conflict were only welfare detrimental in the pure moral hazard case (see Proposition 1), they relax the upper-and tighten the lower threshold of credible bonuses which will turn out to have an ambiguous effect on welfare.
In the sequel, we call a certain effort level p > 0 implementable if for the incentive compatible bonus to implement p, b(p), it holds that b(p) ∈ [b min , b max ]. Furthermore, we define the minimum implementable effort p min and the maximum implementable effort p max implicitly by b min = b(p min ) and b max = b(p max ). Note that b max > b min > 0 implies p max > p min > 0. Let us denote the optimal effort level by p * and corresponding profits by Π * . If the value of the project is sufficiently large to establish a relationship 10 one can distinguish between three cases (see Proposition 5 in Appendix B): i) the case of a binding lower truth-telling constraint, ii) the case of a binding upper truth-telling constraint, and iii) the case of a non-binding truth-telling constraint. The comparative statics in the latter case have already been analyzed in Proposition 1 (as the principal simply implements p * =p in this case). The analysis of cases i) and ii) deserves some more attention. To this end, the following Lemma captures the comparative statics of p min and p max with respect to the level of conflict and the parameters of the information technology.
LEMMA 2: (Truth-Telling Constraints) (i) dp min dΨ > 0 and dp max dΨ > 0. (ii) dp max dg > 9 A comprehensive discussion of the comparative statics of b max and b min can be found in Appendix B. 10 We show in Appendix B that there exists φ > 0 with φ > φ such that it is optimal for the principal to implement a positive effort level whenever φ > φ. Hence, the truth-telling constraint aggravates agency costs and thereby requires larger project values than in the pure moral hazard case for the optimality of positive efforts.
14 0 and dp min dg > 0. (iii) dp max dρ > 0 and dp min dρ < 0 if ψ is sufficiently large. (iv) dp max dx > 0 and dp min dx > 0 if ψ is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As the level of conflict ψ lifts the minimal credible bonus b min and the maximal credible bonus b max while leaving the incentive compatible bonus b(p) unaltered, p min and p max increase in ψ (Part (i)). Intuitively, the more conflict, the less tempting it is to cheat on the agent (upper truth-telling constraint) and the more tempting it is to evade conflict through unconditional bonus-payments (lower truth-telling constraint).
In contrast, a higher quality of the principal's signal g lowers the incentive compatible bonus b(p) (as bonuses are paid more often) but leaves b min and b max unaltered. Hence, the better the principal's signal, the less costly is the implementation of a certain effort level and the higher is the maximal implementable effort p max . However, lower costs of effort implementation also increase the minimal effort level that can credibly be implemented (p min ) (Part (ii)).
In contrast to this, the impact of ρ and x on p min and p max is more subtle (see Parts (iii) and (iv)). These parameters of the information technology influence the minimal, the maximal and the incentive compatible bonus. As a result, ρ and x have a direct and an indirect effect on p min and p max . Both parameters modify the probability with which the principal could gain from a lie, but also change the expected psychological costs which have to be compensated by the incentive compatible bonus. Part (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2 show that, if ψ is sufficiently large such that the gains from a lie are sufficiently pronounced, the former effect dominates the latter.
Welfare Analysis To analyze the comparative statics of the surplus (which is identical to the principal's profits in our set-up), observe that the impact of a parameter y on profits Π(p) can be written as dΠ(p) dy = ∂Π(p) ∂y + ∂Π ∂p dp dy . We will refer to the first term as the direct effect and the second as the indirect effect. The direct effect captures the impact of the parameter on profits for a given effort level. By the envelope theorem, this fully determines the comparative statics of equilibrium profits in the pure moral hazard case (recall that ∂Π ∂p = 0 for p =p) as depicted in Proposition 1(iii). For a binding truthtelling constraint, the indirect effect can no longer be neglected and may well dominate and reverse the comparative statics of the pure moral hazard case as demonstrated by the following result. Proof. See Appendix A. Proposition 2 indicates two different effects which may reverse the comparative statics of the pure moral hazard case. First, the upper truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in particular the case for large project values φ which induce large marginal benefits and therefore require optimal effort levels beyond p max . An increase in ψ or x is welfare detrimental for a given effort level (i.e. ( ∂Π ∂ψ,x ) < 0) but also pushes p max (as indicated in Lemma 2, p max is increasing in Ψ and increasing in x if Ψ is sufficiently large) and thereby relaxes the upper truth-telling constraint. As indicated by Proposition 2(i) and (iii), the latter (indirect) effects indeed dominate the former (direct) effects if project values are sufficiently large. Hence, higher probabilities or levels of conflict are welfare enhancing in the case of valuable projects for which the upper truth-telling constraint is binding. 15
Second, the lower truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in particular the case for small project values which are sufficiently attractive to sign contracts on small positive effort levels but operate with bonus payments which tempt the principal to evade conflict by paying the bonus unconditional on the signal. In this case, the principal suffers from parameter changes which tighten the lower truthtelling constraint. For instance, the higher the quality of the principal's signal g, the larger p min and the more tight the lower truthtelling constraint. In contrast, an increase in g enhances the principal's profit for a given effort level. According to Proposition 2(ii) the latter (direct) effect may well be dominated by the former (indirect) effect. As a consequence, a better signal for the principal may be welfare detrimental in the case of small projects for which the lower truth-telling constraint is binding.
Note that similar detrimental effects cannot be derived for the correlation of signals ρ, as a higher correlation directly enhances the principal's profit and relaxes the lower and the upper truthtelling constraint as long as ψ is sufficiently large (see Lemma 2(iii)).
We conclude with a comparison of equilibrium profits with the first best solution and a discussion of the limit of a perfect signal to the principal, perfectly correlated signals, and no correct independent judgment of the agent. 
Proof. See Appendix A. Part i) indicates that an imperfect information technology of the principal together with an imperfect correlation of the principal's and the agent's signals, and at least some correct independent judgment of the agent induces a welfare loss.
In Part ii) it can be seen that, if signals are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1) or the agent's independent judgement never identifies a good project (x = 0), a first best will be reached whenever the respective incentive compatible bonus b(p F B ) = v (pFB) g = φ g is credible, i.e., b(p F B ) ≤ b max . As the minimal credible bonus b min is zero for ρ = 1 or x = 0, only the upper truth-telling constraint matters in this case and a first best will be established, if the project value is not too large relative to the expected costs of retaliation. This changes if we consider the limit g = 1. Again, a first best is reached whenever the incentive compatible bonus b(p F B ) = φ is credible. However, as b min = (1−ρ)x 1−ρx q * ψ does not vanish as long as ρ < 1 and x > 0, the first best effort can be too large or too small to be implementable. Hence, it requires a 'fine-tuning' of φ (relative to expected costs of conflict) to guarantee a first best solution in this case.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The objective of our paper was twofold. First, we conducted an experiment with subjective performance evaluation and feedback to investigate individual incentives to create conflict in response to a tension between self-perception and performance evaluations by others. Our experimental data indicates that individuals tend to create conflict whenever their own evaluation exceeds the feedback by another party (regardless of whether the feedback also determines the distribution of payoffs or not). This suggests that individuals regard feedback below their self-perception as an ego-threat that triggers attempts to protect one's self-esteem through the creation of conflict.
Second, we propose a simple principal agent model that captures an agent's eagerness 16
to protect his self-esteem and demonstrate how this facilitates principal-agent relationships even if performance signals are subjective, parties do not interact repetitively, and no third-party can enforce truth-telling. In particular, we analyzed the impact of the conflict level, the psychological sensitivity to ego-threats, and the quality of the information technology on optimal effort levels and social welfare. Conflict Level Conflict as modeled in this paper unambiguously reduces optimal effort levels and social welfare in the absence of truth-telling constraints. In the presence of truth-telling constraints, however, we show that some conflict potential is needed to establish a positive effort by the agent and that enhanced conflict levels have a positive effect on social welfare in the case of valuable projects which require substantial bonus payments to the agent. E.g., a well-established (internal or external) system of appeals against managerial decision making is not only providing a more peaceful workforce, it may also create the conflict opportunities needed to make bonus payments credible and thereby raise firm profits. The importance of credible conflict for principal agent relations with subjective information has also been emphasized by McLeod (2003) . However, while McLeod (2003) assumed that the principal could optimally choose conflict levels (through credible payments to a third party in case of conflicting reports), we rather investigate how psychological costs as identified in our experiment may serve the same purpose.
Sensitivity to Ego-Threats Higher levels of conflict unambiguously raise the maximum credible bonus and thereby relax the upper truth-telling constraint in a potentially welfare enhancing way. In contrast, the impact of the psychological sensitivity to egothreats is more subtle. First of all, some sensitivity is needed to establish the prospect of conflict for the principal and thereby ensure truth-telling. The more aggressive the agent reacts to ego-threats, the higher the anticipated level of conflict and the less restrictive the upper truth-telling constraint. Hence, a more aggressive agent will induce a welfare improvement in case of valuable projects. However, the higher the sensitivity of the agent, the larger the required compensation for anticipated psychological costs. This ceteris paribus enhances necessary bonus payments for a given effort level and thereby reduces the principal's profit and social welfare. The ideal agent from the point of view of a principal who wishes to conduct a very valuable project is therefore someone who reacts very aggressively to ego-threats (i.e., who has low costs of retaliation) but does not suffer too much from an ego-threat and the corresponding retaliation (e.g. because q * is large). This reinforces our above-made appraisal of appeal systems and suggests to ensure low costs of conflict creation for the employee (e.g. low costs of law suits etc.). Note, however, that these recommendations only hold for very valuable projects which make the upper truthtelling constraint binding. For non-binding truthtelling constraints, psychological sensitivity and the corresponding conflict remains detrimental to the principal's profits and welfare.
Information Technology We also analyzed the impact of the information technology on optimal efforts and welfare. First of all, the principal is advised to use a signal technology which sends a perfectly correlated signal to her and the agent. With perfectly correlated signals the probability of conflicting signals is zero such that the agent does not expect any psychological costs. Moreover, the lower (upper) truthtelling constraint is decreasing (increasing) in the signal correlation such that the interval of credible bonuses is maximized for a given conflict level. Whenever the first best bonus is credible for perfectly correlated signals, a first best will also be reached -in the absence of limited liability or problems of risk allocation as it is the case in our set-up. This lends support to the practice of using information for performance evaluation which is not necessarily highly correlated with actual performance but ensures a high correlation with the agent's self-assessment. Similarly, the probability of conflict will be zero if the agent does not observe good performance independent of the principal. Hence, a first best can also be achieved with agents who lack an informative independent judgment (i.e., if x = 0). However, minimal and maximal implementable efforts are increasing in x (for high conflict levels), such that implementability of the first best is less straightforward for x = 0 than for perfectly correlated signals.
The impact of the quality of the principal's signal has shown to be subtle. A better signal reduces necessary bonus payments (due to higher expected returns and lower psychological costs for the agent) and thereby lowers agency costs which yields a welfare improvement -unless the lower truthtelling constraint binds, which may be the case for less valuable projects. Hence, the principal cannot expect higher profits from employing a better information technology for all project values. As a consequence he would not always choose a perfect information technology even if this was costless. The optimal choice of an information technology rather deals with a trade-off between agency costs (which are decreasing in the signal quality) and truthtelling constraints (which may well be tightened by a better information technology). Hence, imperfect information technologies as observed in reality may not only be optimal due to cost considerations but also due to the strategic aspects discussed in this paper.
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and p max is implicitly given by
We use these equations to compute the comparative statics of p min and p max . To be specific, let 
Proof of Proposition 2
The impact of a parameter y on equilibrium profits Π(p * ) can be denoted by dΠ(p * ) dy = ∂Π(p * ) ∂y
∂p dp * dy . For ∂Π(p) ∂y see the proof of Proposition 1(iii). ∂Π(p)
). Note that for a fixed p, ∂Π(p) ∂p is a linear increasing function of φ and for a fixed φ it is a decreasing function of p with slope −v (p).
Part (i). Recall from Lemma 2(i) that dp max dψ > 0. Fix any p max ∈ (0, 1). Then, there exists a project value φ such that ∂Π(p) ∂p | p=p max > 0 and p * = p max for all φ > φ . In particular, ∂Π(p) ∂p | p=p * dp * dψ > 0. As dp max dψ and ∂Π(p) ∂ψ are independent of φ and ∂Π(p) ∂p is a linear increasing function of φ, there exists a φ such that dΠ(p * )
Part (ii). Fix any p min ∈ (0, 1) and a positive real number z. Then, there exists an effort cost function v(p) such that v (p min ) v (p min ) > z and there exists a project value φ such that 0 <p < p min and Π(p min ) > 0 (and therefore p * = p min ). Then, by Lemma 2(ii), dp min dg > 0 and ∂Π(p) ∂g = −p dγLH dg (q * Ψ + (Y (1 − q * ) + c(q * ))) > 0 (see the 20 proof of Proposition 1). Now observe that ∂Π(p) ∂g is independent of v(p) and its derivatives while ∂Π ∂p ∂p min ∂g is increasing in v (p) v (p) . Hence, dΠ(p) dg < 0 if z is sufficiently large. Part (iii). Recall from Lemma 2(iv) that there exists aψ such that dp max dx > 0 for all ψ >ψ. Fix any p max ∈ (0, 1) with such a ψ. Then, there exists a project value φ such that ∂Π(p) ∂p | p=p max > 0 and p * = p max for all φ > φ . In particular, ∂Π(p) ∂p | p=p * dp * dx > 0. As dp max dx and ∂Π(p) ∂x are independent of φ and ∂Π(p) ∂p is a linear increasing function of φ,
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i). Follows from non-zero psychological costs and costs of conflict in this case. Part (ii) and (iii). g = 1, ρ = 1, or x = 0 implies that γ LH = 0 and therefore Π(p) = pφ−v(p) such thatp = p F B . However, b(p F B ) has to be in the interval [b min , b max ] which results in the condition displayed in the proposition (recall that for x = 0 or ρ = 1, b min = 0).
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Appendix B
Information Technology
Conditional probabilities γ k,l for signal configuration (s P = k,s A = l) are
Reduced Form Contracts
In our setting with unobservable effort and subjective measures of performance, a contract Γ can only be contingent on the reported subjective opinions of the principal and the agent. Hence, a contract fixes payments for all configurations of reports t P and t A and reads Γ = {w kl | k ∈ S P , l ∈ S A }. The agent accepts a contract if he expects a (weakly) positive utility from it (individual rationality) and chooses p as to maximize his utility (incentive compatibility). If a contract Γ is individually rational and the agent chooses effort p, we say that Γ implements p. Principal and agent report their opinions, i.e. signals, truthfully if and only if they weakly benefit from doing so.
LEMMA 3: Reduced Form Contracts
Suppose there exists a contract Γ which implements p > 0. Then, there always exists a contractΓ which implements p at weakly lower costs and (i) principal and agent tell the truth, (ii) w kl = w km ≡ w k for all k ∈ S P and l, m ∈ S A , and (iii) w H > w L .
PROOF:
To save on notation, we denote
Part(i). For a given contract Γ and signals s P and s A , the principal and the agent decide upon their report. Let σ P : S P → Δ(S P ) and σ A : S A → Δ(S A ) be the principal's and agent's reporting strategies (i.e., mappings from the set of signals S P and S A to the set of probability distributions over S P and S A , respectively). Suppose that (σ * P , σ * A ) is the pair of optimal reporting strategies for contract Γ. Then, the revelation principle implies that there exists a contractΓ which implements the same effort at the same costs and induces truthful reports by principal and agent. We will, henceforth, restrict our analysis to this type of (revelation) contracts.
Part (ii) . Suppose that Γ = {w kl } is a revelation contract, i.e., the principal and the agent tell the truth under contract Γ. As Γ implements p > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied. Consider a contractΓ which fixes payments of
if the principal receives signal s P = k, i.e., payments are independent of s A . These payments also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see above). 11 Moreover, the agent weakly benefits from telling the truth. Finally, the principal's truth-telling constraint is also satisfied underΓ. To see this observe that the principal reports k given that he has received k under contract Γ if
for all o ∈ S P (where (q * ψ) tA,tP denotes the anticipated conflict costs for a reported configuration (t A , t P )). This set of inequalities holds because Γ implements truth-telling by assumption.Γ implements truth-telling if
holds for all o, k ∈ S P . Insertingŵ k andŵ o yields
which coincides with Eqs. 5 and therefore shows that forΓ the principal's truthtelling constraint is satisfied as well. Hence, any revelation contract Γ can be substituted by a revelation contractΓ with w kl independent of l which also implements p > 0 and leaves the principal weakly better off. Part (iii). Suppose by contradiction that Γ implements p > 0 with w H = g and w L = g + with ≥ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be written as
Observe that the numerator of the rhs is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly negative. Hence, the rhs is strictly negative and the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied for any ≥ 0. A contradiction.
Pure Moral Hazard Problem
In this section we abstract from the truthtelling problem inherent to the principalagent relationship in order to analyze the isolated impact of moral hazard on the optimal effort level chosen by the principal and social welfare. Hence, we assume throughout this section that the contract Γ = (f, b) guarantees truth-telling (i.e., truth-telling constraints are non-binding). 
Note that d 2 U(p) dp 2
= v (p) > 0 such that the agent's optimization problem is well-behaved.
Eqn. (6) shows that the incentive compatible bonus that the principal pays to the agent in case he beliefs that the agent did a good job has to overcome marginal effort costs and marginal psychological costs. If the principal wants to induce a positive effort level, he has to offer a positive bonus. Note, however, that the required bonus does not vanish in the limit of small efforts, because marginal psychological costs do not vanish for p = 0. Finally, observe that the incentive compatible bonus increases in target effort p, psychological costs Y , and the conditional probability of conflict (γ LH ). In particular, a higher quality of the principal's signal g reduces the incentive compatible bonus because the agent expects higher returns to effort and the probability of conflict decreases. Likewise, a lower correlation of the signals or a higher probability of a positive independent evaluation by the agent enhances the compensation requested by the agent for a given effort level.
The agent accepts a contract Γ = (f, b) whenever his expected utility from it is weakly positive, i.e. Observe that the upfront-payment can well be negative (i.e., a franchise fee) as the agent is not protected by limited liability. Note in particular that f (b) can always be fixed such that the agent does not receive any rents from the relationship.
To implement effort p > 0 the principal's costs are C(p) = f + p(γ HH + γ HL )b(p) = v(p) + pγ LH ((1 − q * )Y + c(q * )). Note that C(p) is convex and that C(0) = 0. We adopt the convention that an effort p > 0 which is not implementable requires infinite costs. The principal's profit now reads
which is zero for p = 0 and concave for p > 0. We denote the maximum of Π(p) on [0, 1] by p and the corresponding profit for the principal byΠ and derive the following set of results. 13 PROPOSITION 4: Pure Moral Hazard 12 We denote a bonus which implements an effort level of p by b(p). 13 p andΠ are equilibrium effort and profit whenever the truth-telling constraints are non-binding. . This experiment is a project from researchers from the University of Copenhagen and Bamberg University (Germany). It studies people's behavior in work situations.
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount of money that you will receive depends on your decisions as well as another person's decisions. All earnings will be paid out at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment, your income will be calculated in points. These points are converted into Danish kroner (DKK) according to the following exchange rate:
In this experiment you will be randomly grouped into pairs and assigned to one of two different roles. We name these roles Person A and Person B. This means, during the experiment you will be paired with one other person in this room and you will be either Person A or Person B. If you are Person A, you will be paired with Person B and vice versa.
Note, both of you start with an endowment of 200 points in the beginning of the experiment that will be part of your final payoff.
On the following page we will reveal your role, i.e. Person A or Person B, and explain to you what the experiment is about. 10 points = 3.5 DKK Important: Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment and switch off your mobile phones. Read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or any question turns up now or at any time later in the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters. Do, however, not ask out loud, but raise your hand! We will clarify questions privately. You can use the instructions throughout the experiment whenever you want to re-clarify certain things and you may take notes on them, if you wish. lower than the comparable ratio for the incentive treatment. With regard to the average ratio of B-Persons' evaluations and feedback, one can see that in the fast 50 second sessions the ratio is even lower than the average ratio of As' evaluations to feedback. In the other two sessions it is higher, but it is generally lower compared to the incentive treatment. 
